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The Center for Economics and Ethics in the Environment and Development 
University of Versailles - St Quentin-en-Yvelines (UVSQ), France 
 
Abstract: Corporate social responsibility is increasingly discussed in economics and management 
studies today. Corporate leaders often make use of this concept, which finds its origins in philosophy, 
to analyse the normative behaviour of their companies. But what exactly is corporate responsibility? Is 
it a mere concept currently in vogue, or is it a new structural approach which could indeed take 
responsibility into account insofar as long-term environmental preservation is concerned? In order to 
answer this question, this study first proposes a reading of “stakeholders”. This approach poses several 
problems when dealing with corporate responsibility regarding the preservation of nature. Secondly, it 
presents a more detailed analysis of such corporate social responsibility and the problems it poses. The 
debate regarding action with the interest of its outcome and action in the interest of the action itself is 
the focal point of present discussion.  
 




Taxation is a frequently used tool in environmental 
preservation. State intervention thus seems the best way 
to protect nature. Such a concept is based on the 
hypothesis that economic agents are not responsible. 
However, overlooking such an absence of responsibility 
could lead to bad environmental quality, especially 
since State intervention could produce a crowding-out 
effect upon responsibility. It would lead the economic 
agents to believe that: “since I pay for the environment, 
nothing can stop me making use of it, even in an 
abusive manner”. Taxation could hence lead, in certain 
cases, to environmental degradation. It is thus of prime 
importance to take responsible behaviour into account 
in the definition of taxation. First upon the list is 
corporate responsibility. Corporate responsibility has 
today become a classical dilemma amongst managers. It 
has undergone various developments, be it mainly 
through the numerous journals which have dedicated 
several articles to this question (such as the Business 
Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, Ethical 
Enterprise etc). One of the main problem points in the 
past few years seems to be the complex relationship 
between responsibility and nature. The present study is 
aimed at reviewing this delicate relationship. The 
responsibility of a firm was essentially developed upon 
a social base, from which the term ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ originated. Enlargement towards a 
societal  base does not appear to be problematic as long 
as we do not take the aspect of nature into account. 
However, taking this aspect into account does indeed 
reveal itself to be extremely problematic. It does not 
seem to favour the mode of reasoning which analysts 
have preferred until now. The reasoning in vogue led to 
and refers to the theory of stakeholders. This mode of 
reasoning solely takes human beings into consideration. 
This could hence be categorized as an anthropocentric 
approach. Furthermore, the importance of these 
stakeholders greatly depends on the reciprocal interests 
which the firm and the stakeholders themselves could 
achieve through their relationship. Does the natural 
environment then have any meaning as a stakeholder? 
In other words, could and would a firm consider nature 
as an interested party, thus rendering nature a partner in 
its evolution? Various approaches have attempted to 
deal with this enlargement. It is indeed a delicate matter 
to define the interests of nature. This would imply a 
restriction of the firm’s responsibility if it does not take 
the preservation of nature seriously into account. The 
spokespersons for nature could of course have an 
interest in defending nature. But this approach to the 
problem does not offer a total solution. We would thus 
have to deal with the problematic of responsibility from 
a renewed angle of approach. This angle is mainly 
based on the interest in the act of preserving nature as it 
is. This new perspective, based on a bio-ontocentric 
design, puts forward an original conception regarding a 
firm’s responsibility where taking the natural 
environment into account is not merely desired but also 
necessary, through an ethical attitude. 
 
Taking a Closer Look at Environmental 
Responsibility: Present discussion is often centred 
upon responsibility towards nature. The least 
responsible behaviour would then be represented by not 
being concerned about oneself or the other. The fact 
that the environment is polluted or not is of little 
importance to the economic agent. In our opinion, this 
situation is exceptional since there rarely could exist 
such insensitivity. Nevertheless, imposing a tax for 
ecological reasons lies on the idea that economic agents 
do not act in a responsible manner. Then, the 
internalisation of externalities should be imposed in an 
authoritarian manner by the planner, through taxation 
(incentives) and through intergenerational transfers. 
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Environmental economists such as Howarth and 
Norgaard [1] justify State intervention through the 
weak presence of responsibility within economic 
agents. They have attempted to prove that responsibility 
could be understood through altruism. The uniqueness 
of this model lies in the fact that it demonstrates that the 
externality which originates from production does not 
affect domestic utility but rather, the level of 
production. One of the characteristics of this model is 
that it highlights that altruism withers with time. We are 
thus faced with a shortcoming of altruistic behaviour 
(which in turn requires the intervention of public 
authorities). On reading the works of Howarth and 
Norgaard, it seems that the internalisation of 
environmental or intergenerational externalities does 
not in itself guarantee intergenerational equity. The 
distribution of inheritance between generations 
determines if allocations of resources prevents the 
decrease of well-being between generations. The ethical 
argument is that future generations have the right to 
hope for a heritage which would enable them to have 
for themselves a certain level of well-being similar in 
goods and/or natural capital to that of the previous 
generation. The quest of equity could be undertaken by 
a social planner through the offering of compensation to 
future generations for the environmental damage 
caused. However, this would then imply that there 
exists a certain mechanism which makes such transfers 
possible.  
This does not however imply that responsibility is never 
taken into account. Laffont [2]  and Collard [3], for 
example, introduce the concept of morality as a 
constraint upon the allocation and the distribution of 
resources. But the focal point of their analysis consists 
only in solving the problem of coordination as it 
appears in the prisoner’s dilemma. What we could 
conclude from the categorical imperative adapted to 
economic theory is that it is subject to conditionality. 
An individual will undertake an action only if 
everybody else does the same. Others economists like 
Roemer [4] propose an integration of responsibility 
following the principles of Rawls and by mixing 
handicap (positive and negative) to merit (positive and 
negative). However, Roemer does not succeed in well 
explaining individual responsibility: responsibility is 
the task of the Ministry (Equality of Opportunities). If 
the State is defined as guarantor of responsibility, this 
would then imply to a certain extent that the individuals 
are not responsible. It is the imposition, to a certain 
degree, of an artificial responsibility which functions 
solely through coercion or encouragement.  
Since   the   inclusion  of  the  concept of responsibility,  
recent works have oriented economic analysis towards 
a durable and systemic approach. Economists have 
however been unable to satisfactorily develop the 
concept of Responsibility from a global point of view.  
The fact that the question of responsibility has not been 
given enough thought implies that environmental 
preoccupations are traditionally dealt with by the State. 
The State intervenes, through a system of taxation, in 
order to counter pollution. Within this framework, 
taxation fis perceived as an obligation to be responsible.  
Nevertheless, we cannot cast aside responsible 
behaviour.  Certain firms adopt a particular type of 
responsible behaviour. Phillips and Reichart [5], for 
example, illustrate their analysis concerning 
environmental responsibility of firms with the use of 
cases such as the Body Shop or Tom's of Maine. 
Similarly, Gendron [6] highlights that we are now 
noticing in Quebec the emergence of a new concept of 
ecological ethics specific to political leaders and 
distinct from "new social movements" (i.e. citizens or 
managers). 
However, taking responsibility into account also 
implies a questioning the idea that environmental 
preservation is uniquely and traditionally ensured 
through taxation. More precisely, we consider that the 
imposition of a tax brings about an absence of 
responsibility. This logic implies that State intervention 
produces a crowding-out effect on responsible 
behaviour. Frey [7] for example, applies the crowding-
out theory to environmental morality. This crowding-
out effect upon private voluntary contributions has been 
highlighted on numerous occasions [8-10]. Taking 
responsibility into account implies clearly 
distinguishing it from behaviour pertaining to taxation. 
On the one hand, taxation directly improves the quality 
of the environment [11] but on the other, through the 
reduction of responsible behaviour, taxation induces an 
indirect effect on environmental degradation. More 
recently, we notice an emergence of various 
propositions integrating this crowding-out effect. Their 
conclusions partly contrast with those of Howarth and 
Norgaard [1]. In the Howarth-Norgaard model, the 
insufficiency of intergenerational altruism implies the 
necessary intervention of the state whereas these new 
models conclude that State intervention via taxation 
reduces responsible behaviour. Several conclusions 
could be drawn from this model. Firstly, an increase in 
taxes could lead to the degradation of the environment. 
This indeed is not the aim of taxation. Next, when the 
State planner takes responsible behaviour into account, 
it would enable us to obtain a better quality of the 
environment in a situation where the effects of 
responsibility are not taken into account.  
Taking responsibility towards nature into consideration 
opposes, to a certain extent, the premise of state 
intervention. It obliges us to deal with behaviour 
regarding taxation from an ethical perspective. 
 
Integrating Responsibility Towards Nature: What 
Perspectives For Firms?: Reflections on the corporate 
social responsibility are not new. They resemble an 
ethics of responsibility, in opposition to the ethics of 
conviction as specified by Max Weber. Alfred 
Marshall, for example, in a text dated 17th November 
1875 and entitled Some Features of American Industry 
has described the influence of the form of industrial 
development in America and Western Europe upon the 
ethics which predominate in these regions. In his 
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History of economic analysis Schumpeter complains 
that Austrian universities were mainly teaching this 
subject instead of “sound economic theory”. Similarly 
in the 19th century, F. Le Play was to become one of the 
founders of corporate ethics. Since of late, corporate 
social responsibility has been associated to the theory of 
Stakeholders. Though the origin of the stakeholder 
theory dates back to the 1960s or even the 1930s [12], it 
is however, Freeman [13] who brought it to the front 
light. The theory of stakeholders attempts to find out 
the origins of the requests addressed to the company 
and also tries to determine which requests the company 
should primarily take into account. A request for 
responsibility refers to the demands and claims of 
individuals or groups of individuals who show a certain 
interest in the company. We would thus have to 
construct a broader reflection relative to the interactions 
between the company and society, bearing in mind both 
shareholders and stakeholders (NGOs, consumers).  
As such, if we consider that a firm is responsible and 
that it should create processes of response as well as 
other programmes and policies which conform to its 
actions, we would then have to question the extent of 
the firm’s responsibility. Otherwise stated, to which 
requests should one fulfil and what policies should the 
firm establish when it takes all these requests into 
account? 
This leads to a certain classification of requests and 
therefore a classification of responses. The theory of 
stakeholders deals precisely with this question. The 
propositions which refer to this theory are twofold. 
Firstly, propositions aimed at determining ‘who counts’ 
and what is the maximum extension of the circle of 
stakeholders. Secondly, propositions aimed at 
elaborating a classification of stakeholders, based on 
diverse criteria in order to facilitate the management of 
a firm’s responses. Since this second set of propositions 
do not enter into the debates referred to in this study, 
we shall only deal with the first set of propositions. 
Two visions exist in regard to the first aspect i.e. who 
should be taken into account? They could be defined as 
narrow and broad visions. The broad stakeholder vision 
is also proposed Freeman [13], also considered as the 
founder of this concept. According to him ‘A 
stakeholder in an organisation is (by definition) any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives’.  
On the other hand, Clarkson has presented us with one 
of the narrowest definitions [14]. According to him, 
stakeholders are groups or individuals who voluntarily 
or involuntarily face a risk because of the company. 
Those who voluntarily run a risk are those who invest 
in the company, whatever be the form of investment 
(material, human, financial etc). Meanwhile, those who 
involuntarily run a risk are individuals who are placed 
in a situation of vulnerability because of the company’s 
activity.  
The stakeholder controversy between these two visions 
deals with the extent of a firm’s responsibilities. It deals 
with the question that should be taken into account 
when enforcing a strategic policy conforming to 
principles of responsibility. However, the question 
takes on a whole new meaning when we introduce non-
human elements into the field of company 
responsibility and when these elements, especially the 
natural environment, are introduced into the debate.  
The paradigm shift faced by Society in general and 
societies in particular, necessitates a rethinking of our 
analytical framework and taking the environmental 
problematic into account, this time not merely as an 
‘ecologist’ ideology (having, at its best, a “marketing 
effect”), but rather, as a real, objective stake. Indeed, 
the Fordist paradigm has led to a new paradigm based 
on the notion of sustainable development as the basis of 
progress. Thus, the consideration of sustainable 
development strategies directly assists in opening a 
company to its socio-economic and natural 
environment. Company strategies aimed at sustainable 
development actually require systemic modes of 
solution i.e. taking into account the holistic impact on 
ecosystems and societies [15-17]. These strategies thus 
refer to several relations which are external to the 
company. These relations include diverse groups of 
actors and of course, clients and suppliers, but they also 
include actors such as environmental awareness 
associations. The need for social relations to establish 
such solutions thus appears to be evident. As such, the 
necessary information for the creation of a strategy 
based on sustainable development shall require a 
relational investment in various communities because  
of   the   market’s   inability   to furnish such 
information [18]. 
However, the establishment of a relationship between 
strategies of sustainable development, represented by 
the taking into account of the natural environment and 
the opening up of the company to society takes us back 
to the question of enlargement of the theory of 
stakeholders. Several attempts in integrating the natural 
environment into this theory have been proposed. They 
are either centred on an anthropocentric perspective, 
according to which humans enjoy priority over non-
human life forms, or on a bio-centric perspective which 
defends the idea according to which all members of all 
species are considered on an equal footing.  
This integration leads to the initial framework of the 
theory of stakeholders. In an optic of strategic 
management, this initial framework is defined by two 
important characteristics. Firstly, this theory is based on 
the notion of interest. Put more precisely, it is based on 
the idea that the company opens unto its environment 
because reciprocal interests are expected from one and 
the other. The company enters into contact with the 
stakeholders because this, in its eyes, represents a 
method for obtaining information and could thereby 
serve in refining its predictions on the demands and 
expectations of its environment. Next, the stakeholders 
taken into account are solely human beings. 
Stakeholders could be extremely diverse i.e., suppliers, 
clients, associations for the protection of the 
environment, consumer protection associations, human 
J. Social Sci., 1 (1): 31-38, 2005 
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rights leagues etc, but they constitute, in all cases, a 
direct relationship to the demands forwarded by 
humans.  
The attempts presented here are incorporated into the 
enlargement of the theory of stakeholders in order to 
offer non-humans, most importantly the natural 
environment, a similar status to that of humans. We 
shall now discuss an attempt based on biocentrism and 
another based on anthropocentrism to show the limits of 
each of these approaches.  
Starik [17] attempted to broaden the theory to non-
human participants within a bio centric perspective. In 
order to do this, he uses the concept of “Gaïa” and that 
of the ‘living planetary system’- a naturalist and 
Aristotelian hypothesis, first forwarded by Lovelock 
[19]. Planet earth is perceived as a gigantic living 
organism capable of autoregulation and auto adjustment 
in regard to exogenous shocks, without human action. 
On a more philosophical note, this idea replies to the 
notion of ‘biotic communities’ through the concept of 
Land Ethic. For the author, these foundations seem to 
represent a diachronic link between humans and other 
living beings: ‘Human beings, plants, animals, earth 
and water are all linked to a community which presents 
great activity composed of cooperation and 
competition, a biotope’, [20].  
According to Orts and Strudler [21], however, Starik’s 
[17] work is aimed more at convincing managers, rather 
than proposing a real academic discussion. As such, the 
broad theory of stakeholders, within a biocentric 
perspective, has not been able to avoid critiques. 
In order to be valid and to comply with the theory of 
stakeholders, this perspective should, as a matter of 
fact, assume that the natural environment could have 
interests of its own. We shall now proceed to discuss 
this problematic.  
Could the natural environment have interests of its 
own? This implies that these interests could be 
identified even though they cannot be expressed. 
Moreover, the notion of interests refers, within this 
theoretical framework, to needs and desires which in 
turn become demands. It is however difficult to speak 
of nature’s desires and still less of its demands. The 
utilitarian vision of interest is not valid for nature since 
nature is unable to express what is good or bad for 
itself. 
In a biocentric approach, on the other hand, nature can 
undergo suffering. A first attempt in integrating nature 
into the stakeholder theory could thus be initiated upon 
this basis. The consideration of various ecological 
domains serves as a reference, for example, in 
distinguishing flourishing domains and those which are 
undergoing irreversible degradations. This distinction 
would help introduce the concept of the needs of nature. 
Let us take, for example, a field where a farmer has 
sprayed pesticides and chemical fertilizers to such an 
extent that it no longer yields anything, not a single 
crop nor flora could grow anymore. In such a case, it is 
clearly evident that the earth needs to be disintoxicated 
or decontaminated before it could once again produce a 
crop. Admittance of the notion of need does not, 
however, imply that the earth would have any interest 
in this decontamination. This reveals that one could 
identify a need but not an interest. Similarly, a damaged 
work of art  needs to be restored, but this not imply that 
it has an interest in being restored ; a car, meanwhile, 
needs petrol to function, but we cannot state that it has 
an interest in having petrol. The very notion of need 
could itself be questioned. The needs as expressed here 
are anthropocentric. The painting needs to be restored 
only if man wishes to conserve it. Similarly, the field 
needs to be decontaminated only to be used by man. It 
hardly seems possible to define an interest of nature 
through these observations. Nor is it possible to identify 
a need of nature. This undoubtedly casts shadows over 
attempts to broaden the theory of stakeholders.  
Let us nevertheless admit that one could go beyond this 
first critic. Let us then suppose that objects could 
indeed have personal interests. In other words, that 
nature, as an object, could have it own interests. We 
would then face a second critic, this time forwarded by 
Sagoff [22]. His critic could be presented as follows: 
Let us imagine that an object could have needs and that 
it would cease to exist if these needs are not met. In this 
case, it is possible to consider that the object has a 
certain interest in the satisfaction of its needs. 
Admittance of this relation between a need and interest 
of an object does not, however, identify the object. 
Indeed, if the natural environment could be considered 
as an object, this reasoning could then be applied to it, 
but other objects could also enter into the equation. As 
such, saying that the natural environment could have 
interests implies that all objects could have interests- a 
natural resort, just as a work of art, a building or even a 
table. Such an assumption leads us to a shortcoming in 
the theory of stakeholders. How could a company 
decide to whom it should give priority? To a chair or to 
a table? We would thus require a special technique 
which would enable the weighting of objects’ interests 
in order to classify them in order of priority. Such 
reasoning does not seem very convincing in giving 
nature priority. But there indeed is no doubt that the 
natural environment could not stand on the same level 
as a chair or a building.  
Indeed, although we could clearly admit that certain 
plants and animals have needs, this does not, however, 
imply the need for preserving an animal species or a 
certain variety of plants. This is because the very 
meaning of evolution itself implies the creation and 
destruction of species. As such, we cannot derive, 
through the concept of needs, a clearly identifiable 
group of interests other than those of humans. 
Orts and Studler [21] thus consider that Starik’s 
attempts cannot be upheld. They nevertheless stress that 
it is not incoherent to state that nature as such has no 
interest of its own and it therefore has no interest to be 
preserved, but, at the same time and as a moral 
question, the respect of nature requires its preservation. 
The example of the maltreatment of animals clearly 
illustrates this point. Legislation now prohibits the 
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maltreatment of animals, not because of their right to 
life or because man hunts or slaughters them for food or 
mere pleasure, but rather, civilised society prohibits 
such action because it seems degrading for man to 
brutalise them. 
A second possibility in integrating natural environment 
into the theory of stakeholders is through human 
interest for nature. We could thus construct an 
anthropocentric approach. Phillips and Reichart [5] are 
the main references regarding this approach. According 
to them, the theory of stakeholders could take the 
natural environment into account through human 
interests, in other words, through human stakeholders 
who are concerned by nature. Even though nature in 
itself could not be considered as a stakeholder, the 
theory of stakeholders could produce a moral reason to 
protect the natural environment since human 
stakeholders are concerned about it. As such, the 
interests of spokespersons, environmental activists and 
NGOs could be to defend nature or, more precisely, to 
defend the preservation of certain elements. 
These authors see examples of such reasoning in certain 
environment-friendly companies such as The Body 
Shop. It actually is quite the opposite. Competition 
pushes companies to look for openings in the market 
where they could invest and which would enable them 
to distinguish themselves from their competitors. 
Within this context of reasoning, the protection of the 
environment is thus a mere marketing tool, just like any 
others. Companies would invest in it only as long as it 
brings them gains. There is hence no reason to believe 
that there could be any responsible behaviour vis-à-vis 
the environment. Even though cases of double 
dividends (profit and the protection of the 
environment), or even triple dividends (profit, 
protection of the environment and creation of jobs) 
exist, these double and triple dividends cannot, 
however, be generalised. Moreover, situations where 
the search for profit has caused great environmental 
damage are indeed quite frequent. We could 
nevertheless notice a certain category of behaviour on 
the part of consumers and shareholders who are in 
favour of increasing the various forms of a particular 
company’s responsibilities. This does not, however, 
solve the question pertaining to nature’s priority over 
other forms of societal investment. 
Moreover, the objective of  Phillips and Reichart [5] is 
not to create a general principle which could be adopted 
by all reasonable beings, but rather, highlights that the 
theory of stakeholders, as a method for taking nature 
into account, cannot easily be cast away. 
However, there still remains one obstacle. The 
conflicting interests between any stakeholders still 
persist. This, as shown by Evans and Freeman [23], is 
nevertheless an important problem. As the number of 
stakeholders increases, so too does the risk of 
conflicting interests. This implies that the natural 
environment is treated as any other social problem or as 
any other interests demanded by any stakeholder. 
Finally, this would imply that man does not take the 
question of the protection of nature seriously. We 
would therefore require an alternative mode of 
reasoning. This however does not mean that we should 
refute the theory of stakeholders, but rather, that we 
may have to interpret it in a different way. As stated by 
Freeman, the theory of stakeholders should be 
interpreted as a ‘genre of stories about how we live’ 
[24]. This new mode of reasoning would probably 
require us to give an inherent value to nature  “since 
only this value could help us be aware of environmental 
preoccupations which cannot be explained through the 
notions of instrumental and intrinsic values” [25]. This 
value thus adds a moral consideration which could be 
translated by the obligations of an individual towards 
this particular value.  
 
A New Approach: The theory of stakeholders, taken as 
a final product of developments pertaining to company 
responsibility, no doubt represents a very interesting 
analytical perspective. Its fault, however, lies in its 
incapacity to seriously consider the natural environment 
as a specific domain which should merit a company’s 
attention. The arguments that follow reach beyond this 
perspective. The discussion shall comprise of three 
stages. Firstly, the theory of stakeholders as an analysis 
of company responsibility is one amongst many 
methods in dealing with the problem. It would be 
judicious to directly refer to ethics rather than make 
reference to a management perspective. Secondly, a 
moral perspective is compatible to the concept of 
interest. This concept only takes on a specific meaning. 
Finally, once these two arguments which would enable 
us to elaborate the ethical responsibilities of a company 
have been established, we shall analyse the integration 
of the natural environment as an extension of this 
responsibility. The specificity of the environmental 
stake shall then enable us to arrive at a priority in taking 
the preservation of nature into account. This approach 
is based on a bio-ontocentric approach. This concept 
highlights the reciprocal relations between organisms 
and their environment. It is based on the consciousness 
and acknowledgement of the natural limits imposed 
upon economic   growth. The   conceptual   base   of 
bio-ontocentrism is biocentrism whose ethical 
extension is aimed at ontology, i.e. whose principle is 
the protection of life, where life has a value of its own.  
The first stage of our attempts in rethinking company 
responsibility is aimed at analysing the extent to which 
the theory of stakeholders, as a method grasping this 
responsibility, represents just one particular and 
instrumental vision of ethics. The theory of 
stakeholders, especially the narrower version of this 
theory, is mainly based on the consideration of a 
company’s and individuals’ reciprocal interests. In 
other words, the latter is interested in seeing the 
company make profit, while the company, in turn, has a 
certain “interest” in taking the individuals' requests into 
account, if it is to remain efficient. This method is 
wholly comprehensible if looked at through a 
managerial optic. The company attempts to discover the 
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demands and claims of its socio-economic 
environment. The anticipation of these exigencies 
enables the company to provide better answers, with 
greater speed and efficiency. The company thus saves a 
certain amount of negotiation and adjustment costs and 
creates for itself an image of responsibility before 
society. However, this mode of reasoning makes 
responsibility an instrumental ethical notion.  
Consideration of the other uniquely based upon the 
demands he puts forward, or which he could potentially 
put forward, especially regarding the reduction of costs, 
renders the other a means to an end. This end represents 
the quest of personal interest. This of course, does not 
imply that the consideration of the demands of the 
socio-economic environment is necessarily 
instrumental. Rather, it merely implies that it becomes 
instrumental if the consideration of this environment is 
done solely in order to achieve one of the company’s 
objectives. Still, the relationship between stakeholders 
and reciprocal interest seems to confirm this 
instrumental vision.  
Although a certain number of moral propositions, 
including utilitarianism, seem to comply with this 
vision, other moral traditions firmly oppose such a 
vision. Kantian moral philosophy is such an example. 
What we wish to highlight at this point is the singular 
character of the responsible process based on the theory 
of stakeholders. As such, the rejection of the 
broadening of this theory through the integration of 
nature does not remove all possibilities of creating a 
certain responsibility for the company regarding nature. 
The broadening of Kantian moral philosophy is one 
possibility. Moreover, Kantian moral philosophy is 
compatible with certain aspects of the theory of 
stakeholders, such as the notions of interest and 
vulnerability and thus risk. The second phase thus 
consists in dealing with the notion of interest.  
The theory of stakeholders refers to the notion of 
interest. However, this concept could be dealt with in a 
relatively different perspective than that of the 
managerial optic. We would have to distinguish 
between acting in the name of an interest other than 
duty and acting in the name of interest itself. Thus, as 
notes by Rawls [26], an action accomplished out of 
duty is not an action without interest, but rather, an 
action carried out for duty itself “An action done for the 
sake of duty is one from an interest taken in the action 
itself as correctly answering, or so we think, the 
principles of practical reason”. The fact that an action is 
accomplished out of interest for the action itself renders 
this a moral action. As such, as Rawls, states, all action 
is triggered by interest. One must understand that there 
is no action triggered solely by reason and that a 
reasonable action is also triggered by interest, an 
interest for the action itself. Only moral actions depend 
on an interest for the action itself. Non moral actions, 
meanwhile, depend on the interest for the objective 
which would be achieved upon completion of the act. 
An action would of course have to conform to the 
categorical imperative if it is to be considered moral. 
Morality thus presupposes the respect of two stages. 
Firstly, the interest which triggers the action should be 
an interest for the action itself. Next, the action should 
comply with the maxim of action “Act only according 
to the maxim. As such, you could want while it 
becomes a universal law” [27].  
This distinction between acting out of interest and 
conceptualising an interest adds a motivational structure 
to action [28, 29]. This structure gives priority to 
practical interest regarding moral principles over 
interests concerning objects of need and desire. As 
stated yet again by Rawls [26] “this means that the 
interest moving our actions are of different kinds and 
arranged in a certain structure with the practical interest 
we take in the moral law itself, so far as we have a good 
will, always having an effective regulative priority”. 
This does not however imply that interests for the 
object of action are incompatible with the interest for 
moral law. An individual who acts magnanimously and 
with compassion towards others but gains satisfaction 
through his action does not however carry out an action 
which is contrary to moral law. Nevertheless, we cannot 
assume that it is his feelings that give a moral character 
to his action. As such, even though an individual shows 
no feeling, or is totally insensitive, moral action still 
remains the same. Moreover, the interest for the action 
gives priority to the respect of moral principles. Even in 
this case, the individual accomplishes what is required 
from him by duty because of the motivational structure 
which gives priority to interest for action over interest 
for the end result achieved through action.  
The notion of interest is thus not incompatible with 
morality. Rather, it takes on a particular meaning 
because  the lexical structure of motivations encourages  
action i.e. because of the classification of motivations 
which offers a systematic priority to moral motivation 
over all other motivation.  
It now remains to be shown that nature can be 
preserved because of an interest for the action of 
preservation in itself, or, in other words, that the 
preservation of nature corresponds to principles of 
ethics. Jonas [30], going against the modern wave of 
thought and thereby joining antiquity’s naturalism, 
reintegrates nature into his moral dimension. He thus 
offers us a grid of analysis which could be employed in 
our reasoning.  
The respect of nature first deals in finding out whether 
it possesses a moral signification or not. We would first 
have to recompose man/nature relationships through the 
principle of responsibility if we are to answer this 
question. Jonas enlarges the Kantian moral perspective 
by reforming the categorical imperative as follows: 
“Act so that the effects of your action are compatible 
with the permanence of genuine human life’ or ‘Act so 
that the effects of your action are not destructive to the 
future possibility of such a life” [30]. Through this 
imperative, Jonas attempts to comply with the new 
dimensions of responsibility.  
This responsibility, always according to Jonas, obliges 
us to transmit, to the following generations, an 
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environment which would enable life to continue. 
Taking life into account thus implies the necessity to 
take account of historical time through the notion of 
irreversibility (such as the degradation of bio-diversity). 
Thus,   for  Jonas,  the  duty of humanity is, before all, 
bio-ontological. Ontology considers life as a whole and 
thus requires the respect of each place and each object. 
Jonas does not, in order to achieve this, attempt to 
positively found the preservation of humanity, but 
rather, he poses the existential base upon free action 
and which is thus conditional of man. Jonas thus moves 
away from “bio spherical egalitarianism”. This concept 
goes against his own philosophy. It advocates a 
responsible and therefore ethical, human being. 
However, according the same value to all living beings 
excludes all responsibility. Jonas increasingly refers to 
a categorical differentiation between beings and thus, 
through extension, between the environments wherein 
these beings evolve (such as nature reserves or, still 
closer to us, parks and gardens or water which should 
not be polluted). This implies that certain species 
should be protected because they have a certain 
“intrinsic vulnerability” within them.  
Ontology, here, does not refer to an arbitrary action 
which advocates the accomplishment of an aesthetic 
preference (such as nature, for example), but rather, it 
proposes a rational ethical base. As such, Jonas’ 
response to the nihilistic challenge could be observed 
through the application of a “preliminary metaphysical 
field’ which highlights the possibility that the presence 
of  a  world is preferable to the absence of one”, 
Dewitte [31] develops this idea by showing that Jonas 
accords a human “yes” which is considered as the 
extension of the affirmation of a being’s value which 
has already occurred in the being itself. This implies 
and demonstrates that a finality evolves and 
distinguishes itself differently from conscience and 
human desire. Let us however not forget that an ethical 
attitude is possible solely with and for man. Does this 
mean that nature cannot be ethical? Indeed, nature is 
not and shall never be, ethical. It is precisely because it 
cannot be ethical that man is required to be ethical with 
nature. As such, man becomes the subject of 
responsibility and nature, the object. Nature thereby 
claims its rights without having any duties. Nature is 
recognised as such but has no obligation towards man 
even though man himself has obligations towards 
nature. This is because man is born of nature. Thus, 
having obligations implies that nature enforces 
obligations upon itself. According to Kant, however, 
the capacity of self constraint is above all, a human 
characteristic. This leads us to believe that nature has 
rights, including the right to life. The fact that it 
possesses only rights and nothing else makes it 
vulnerable since it is incapable of making others respect 
its own rights. Man thus has the duty of responsibility 
towards nature. 
Nature, according to Jonas is thus perceived as fragile 
and vulnerable. Although Jonas’ arguments are 
categorical, Jonas does not, however, advocate an 
absolute “wilderness”. While rejecting a purely 
anthropological approach, Jonas believes that nature 
needs man in order to exist and thus, man should 
integrate himself into his natural environment. Jonas 
hence proposes the creation of mechanisms of 
prevention and protection through the bio-ontological 
concept. The originality of this author is to totally break 
away from traditional anthropocentric ethics. At first 
sight, we may consider that putting man in the forefront 
(cf. future generations), could represent an 
anthropocentric method. Asserting this does not suffice. 
The finality of responsibility does not lie within man 
and for man, but rather, in the permanence of being.  
According nature an ethical meaning admits a moral 
interest for the action of preserving nature. Here, we do 
not deal with an interest for an objective achieved by 
the action which would be the well-being of future 
generations. Rather, we deal with an interest for the 
action in itself, where it relates to a moral motivation. 
This reasoning complies with the Kantian method 
previously elaborated in two stages: the interest for the 
action itself which relates to the moral motivation and 
the categorical imperative as formulated by Jonas. It is 
hereafter not incompatible to think that nature 
represents an interest for a company and, more 
specifically, that nature gives it priority because of the 
lexical classification of moral motivations. 
Within such a perspective, the use of the term “interest 
party” instead of stakeholders is a semantic variation 
with a particular meaning. This semantic variation 
enables us to differentiate between possessing a stake 
and representing a concerned party. Although their role 
as stakeholders could be contested, NGOs, company 
organisations as well as scientific circles, for example, 
still represent concerned parties taking part in the 




Environmental responsibility is not uniquely reserved to 
the domain of taxation. Said otherwise, taxation could 
provoke a crowding- out effect over responsibility. It 
would then be useful to introduce corporate social 
responsibility into this analysis.  
Corporate social responsibility has undergone several 
developments which have led to the theory of 
stakeholders. Attempts to broaden this theory, whether 
they be founded upon an anthropocentric or bio-centric 
perspective, seem to face several major difficulties. 
Biocentrism, for example, faces a major difficulty. 
Indeed, adopting such a point of view implies that 
nature, as a finality in itself, has the capacity to impose 
ethical norms upon man. Taken as a system of 
domination, this vision is just as limited as 
anthropocentrism (opposite reasoning). 
These two approaches remain entirely normative 
(absence of rules of conduct) and only indicates a 
system of values, most often anthropocentric, to which 
an individual adheres. This inability to achieve a certain 
normative standard (judgement of values which 
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includes duty), leads these approaches to systematically 
answer to the dysfunctionings of the natural 
environment. Consideration of the natural environment 
could only be grasped at an ultimate level, that of 
philosophical ethics which requires a great degree of 
abstraction; the bio-ontological approach is one such 
illustration. This approach has several advantages. 
Firstly, it considers the natural environment seriously 
and gives it a systematic priority over other objects of 
responsibility. The preservation of life offers priority, in 
an ethical perspective, to the action of preservation 
itself, beyond the consequences of what this may imply. 
Next, this approach is compatible with the theory of 
stakeholders on several important points such as the 
notion of interest and vulnerability, even though these 
very notions take on a new dimension. Finally, this 
approach remains coherent with the perspective of 
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